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Abstract. Previous research suggests that positive stimuli are often approached as well as recognized faster than negative stimuli. We argue
that this effect does not hold if negative stimuli are associated with threat. Based on fear module theory (hman & Mineka, 2001, 2003), we
argue that individuals recognize threatening stimuli faster than positive stimuli because of a constant monitoring of the environment for
threatening objects. Moreover, based on the assumption of a motivational account underlying approach-avoidance responses (Krieglmeyer &
Deutsch, 2010), we assume the recognition then directly evokes a careful and slow approach of threatening objects. Applying a response time
task that measures approach movement and recognition times within the same task, we found that individuals recognize threatening pictures
faster than positive pictures, but approach the threatening pictures slower than the positive pictures.
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Recent research has demonstrated that individuals
recognize (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992;
Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmller, & Danner, 2008;
Unkelbach et al., 2010) and approach (Brendl, Markman,
& Messner, 2005; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer,
Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; Krieglmeyer &
Deutsch, 2010; van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008) neg-
ative stimuli slower than positive stimuli. In this article, we
hypothesize that this might not hold true when negativity is
related to threat. Based on fear module theory (hman &
Mineka, 2001, 2003) and the assumption of a motiva-
tional account underlying approach-avoidance responses
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010), we assume that individu-
als recognize threatening stimuli faster and approach them
more slowly than positive stimuli.
Responses Toward Positive and
Negative Stimuli
Research has repeatedly shown that individuals are faster at
consciously recognizing positive stimuli than negative stim-
uli (Bargh et al., 1992; Unkelbach et al., 2008, 2010). For
example, Bargh et al. (1992) found that positive attitude
objects were evaluated more quickly than negative ones.
Similarly, Unkelbach et al. (2010) found that individuals
are faster at identifying positive compared to negative
words. In what they referred to as the density hypothesis,
the authors account for this phenomenon by arguing that
positive information is more densely organized than
negative information and that this increased density in turn
leads to faster identification of positive stimuli.
Other research suggests that individuals approach posi-
tive stimuli faster than negative stimuli (Brendl et al., 2005;
Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer et al., 2001; Krieglmeyer
& Deutsch, 2010; van Dantzig et al., 2008). For example,
Chen and Bargh (1999) demonstrated that participants
responded faster toward positive stimuli by pulling
(approach) than by pushing (avoidance) a lever, and faster
toward negative stimuli by pushing (avoidance) a lever than
by pulling (approach) it. Further research showed that the
different response to positive and negative stimuli is not
limited to a specific direction of movement (pulling or
pushing), but rather depends on whether the direction of
movement is framed as approach or avoidance (Eder &
Rothermund, 2008; Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack,
2008; see also, Brendl et al., 2005). In this sense, any move-
ment can represent approach if the response elicits a virtual
movement of the stimuli toward the participants, or avoid-
ance if the response causes a virtual movement of the stim-
uli away from the participants (Morange & Bloch, 1996;
Seibt et al., 2008; van Dantzig et al., 2008; von Hofsten
& Rçnnqvist, 1988). Irrespective of how approach and
avoidance movements are defined, it is generally agreed
that the recognition and evaluation of a stimulus activates
a related behavioral schema (Eder & Rothermund, 2008;
Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Lavender & Hommel,
2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). That is, the recognition
of positive stimuli activates behavioral approach schemata
and the recognition of negative stimuli activates behavioral
avoidance schemata. As a result, movements compatible to
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the activated schema can be performed faster than move-
ments incompatible to the activated schema.
Notwithstanding the close link between recognition and
activation of approach-avoidance movements, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that both represent different concepts
and should be measured independently from each other.
This is, unfortunately, rarely the case. The majority of
approach-avoidance measures does not measure approach
or avoidance movements separately from recognition, but
rather lumps these components together. In the task applied
by Chen and Bargh (1999), for example, the time between
the presentation of a stimulus and the initial response with a
lever was measured, but not the time for the movement of
the lever from a point A to a point B. However, tasks that
would differentiate between approach and recognition
responses could provide important insights into how and
when the two concepts are related, when they are indepen-
dent, or when they are negatively correlated. Interestingly,
only few methods, such as the task from Bamford and
Ward (2008) or the Recognition and Behavioral Approach
Task (RaBAT; Genschow et al., 2013), allow disentangling
the speed of a movement from the time individuals need to
recognize a stimulus. As we relied on the RaBAT in the
present study, we now describe this task in more detail.
The Recognition and Behavioral Approach
Task (RaBAT)
Participants working on the RaBAT (Genschow et al.,
2013) have to press the space bar on a computer keyboard
as soon as they have recognized a picture on the screen.
Afterwards, they have to press a key closer to the screen
(the Z key on a Swiss keyboard; Y key on English language
keyboards) as fast as possible, which elicits a virtual move-
ment of the picture toward the participants to give the illu-
sion that the stimulus actually moves toward participants
(cf. Seibt et al., 2008). Although many subprocesses (e.g.,
recollection, familiarity) may be involved in the recognition
of objects (for research measuring event-related potentials,
see Rugg & Curran, 2007), recognition in the RaBAT is
understood as the time between the appearance of a stimu-
lus and the pressing of the space bar. The time between
pressing the space bar and pressing the Z key is defined
as the approach movement time. While recognition time
is assumed to represent a neutral response resulting from
a cognitive evaluation of the stimulus, approach movement
time reflects a more meaningful component, because it
causes the stimulus to come closer – visually at least. Sim-
ilar to assumptions of affective primacy (e.g., Zajonc, 1984)
and embodied cognition (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou,
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005), according to
which embodied movements often precede conscious pro-
cesses, the RaBAT assumes that the mere perception of a
stimulus automatically activates a corresponding response.
In line with the assumption of a motivational account
underlying approach movements (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch,
2010), we assume that the recognition of a stimulus facili-
tates such responses that are associated with fundamental
needs of survival and nurturance. That is, positive stimuli
facilitate and negative stimuli inhibit the execution of the
approach movement. Beside the ability to measure recogni-
tion and approach separately another advantage of the
RaBAT is its simplicity because individuals respond toward
every stimulus in the same manner. Therefore, the RaBAT
is not affected by task switching abilities, the interpretation
of categories, or strategic answering behavior, which has
been identified to influence the results of double categoriza-
tion tasks like the implicit association test (e.g., Fiedler,
Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Rothermund & Wentura,
2004).
In line with previous research on recognition (Bargh
et al., 1992; Unkelbach et al., 2008, 2010) and approach
responses (Brendl et al., 2005; Chen & Bargh, 1999;
De Houwer et al., 2001; Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010;
van Dantzig et al., 2008), a pilot study (Genschow et al.,
2013) that applied the RaBAT found that participants rec-
ognized (M = 459 ms) as well as approached (M =
247 ms) positive stimuli faster than negative stimuli (M =
482 ms; M = 261.03 ms, for recognition and approach,
respectively). Extending this research, we suggest that
(a) response latencies for recognition and approach move-
ments may not always be positively correlated and (b) rec-
ognition may not always be slower for negative than for
positive stimuli. Concretely, we hypothesized that negative
stimuli that are related to threat should speed up – not slow
down – recognition compared to positive stimuli and should
slow down approach movements. This hypothesis high-
lights the importance of disentangling recognition from
movement speed.
Responses Toward Threatening
Stimuli
In their fear module theory, hman and Mineka (2001,
2003) propose a specific fear module that constantly mon-
itors the environment for threat in an automatic and uncon-
scious fashion. The authors assume that the fear module
selectively processes those types of fear-relevant stimuli
that have a long phylogenetic history of being associated
with danger toward humans and their evolutionary ances-
tors and thus ensures a rapid detection of threatening stim-
uli. Furthermore, fear module theory supposes that the
detection of fear-related objects evokes an in-born defense
mechanism shaped by an evolutionary development, which
ensures a functional preparation to take action and to deal
with the situation properly (Mineka & hman, 2002;
hman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Williams, Watts,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). An explanation of how such
a functional behavioral response may work is offered by a
motivational account underlying approach-avoidance
impulses (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010). According to this
account, the evaluation of a stimulus induces a motivational
orientation that prepares an organism to increase or
decrease the distance between the self and the object
in order to fulfill fundamental needs of survival and
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nurturance. Regarding threatening stimuli, it is plausible to
assume that the evaluation elicits a fast avoidance or a slow
approach response.
Individual findings on the detection of threatening stim-
uli are in line with the predictions of fear module theory.
For instance, hman et al. (2001) demonstrated that in a
visual search paradigm fear-relevant stimuli such as snakes
or spiders are detected faster than fear-irrelevant stimuli
such as flowers or mushrooms. This basic finding has been
replicated among many other studies (e.g., Lipp & Waters,
2007; Tipples, Young, Quinlan, Broks, & Ellis, 2002).
Moreover, research indicates that this pattern is already
present at preschool age (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008,
2010) and holds for modern threats such as syringes, guns,
and knives (Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005).
Likewise there is also evidence from studies with
approach-avoidance measures that indicate slowed down
approach responses for threatening compared to positive
stimuli (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Rinck & Becker,
2007). For example, in a study by Krieglmeyer and Deutsch
(2010), participants were faster in approaching butterfly
pictures than spider pictures and faster in avoiding spider
than butterfly pictures. A more elegant test of the theoreti-
cal assumption that threatening stimuli lead to fast recogni-
tion and slow approach responses would involve the
assessment of recognition and approach latencies within
the same response sequence. As described before, the
RaBAT (Genschow et al., 2013) allows doing this in a most
convenient manner.
Because positive stimuli are generally recognized
faster than negative stimuli (e.g., Genschow et al., 2013;
Unkelbach et al., 2008), the hardest test of whether threat
leads to a fast recognition is the comparison of threatening
stimuli with positive stimuli (and not with neutral or nega-
tive stimuli). Therefore, the present study compares
response latencies toward threatening and positive stimuli.
As spiders are among the most common threatening targets
that go along with warning states, such as fears and phobias
(Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer, & Wik, 1996) or disgust
(Wiens, Peira, Golkar, & hman, 2008), we used pictures
of spiders as threatening stimuli and pictures of butterflies
as positive stimuli.
The RaBAT is a task to measure approach, but not
avoidance responses. Although it could, in principle, be
adapted to measure avoidance latencies, we deliberately
applied the task in its usual form, because avoidance
responses would not provide us with insights into the
research question of this study in which we were interested
to show that threatening stimuli could speed up recognition
and slow down approach movement speed. A finding that
threatening stimuli speed up recognition as well as avoid-
ance would not serve the goal to show that recognition
and movement have to be differentiated.
Method
Participants
During an open day at the University of Basel, 74 visitors
(26 male, 41 female, 7 not reported) with a mean age of
34.51 (SD = 18.13) volunteered to participate in a com-
puter experiment. Eighteen participants were discarded
from the analyses because they did not follow the instruc-
tions (16 persons used two fingers instead of one when
working on the RaBAT), they did not understand the
instructions (one person indicated that she did not under-
stand the instructions at all, because she did not speak
German), or their attention was not directed toward the task
(one person was clearly distracted and interrupted by other
visitors).
Procedure
Participants were tested in pairs or alone. After signing a
statement of agreement, participants completed the RaBAT
(Genschow et al., 2013), indicated basic demographic char-
acteristics, and were then debriefed, thanked, and
dismissed.
Materials and Apparatus
Thirty pictures (each 685 · 549 pixels) served as stimuli
material. In line with Krieglmeyer and Deutsch (2010),
the target pictures contained 10 pictures of spiders and 10
pictures of butterflies.1 As distractor items, we selected
10 pictures of stars. The size of the animals and the back-
ground of the pictures were similar between spider and
butterfly pictures. The experiment was conducted on
IBM-compatible (3,000+ processor) desktop computers
with Windows XP as the system software. Participants
viewed the screen from a distance of approximately
55 cm and responded on a Swiss keyboard.
1 To ensure that the spiders are generally perceived as more threatening than the butterflies, we conducted a pretest with 34 participants
(24 male, 10 female) with a mean age of 25.71 (SD = 8.04). On a paper and pencil questionnaire, participants evaluated every animal on
six 7-point bipolar scales. The negative endpoints of the scales were labeled with ‘‘frightening,’’ ‘‘worrying,’’ ‘‘scary,’’ ‘‘threatening,’’
‘‘menacing,’’ and ‘‘dangerous.’’ The positive endpoints of the scale were labeled with ‘‘benign,’’ ‘‘comforting,’’ ‘‘confidential,’’
‘‘nonhazardous,’’ ‘‘harmless,’’ and ‘‘safe.’’ We averaged the evaluations of the spider pictures (Cronbach’s a = .98) and the evaluations of
the butterfly pictures (Cronbach’s a = .99) into a separate single scale. High values indicate high threat. To test whether participants
evaluated spider pictures as more threatening than butterfly pictures, we conducted a t-test for dependent samples. The results indicate
that participants evaluated spider pictures (M = 4.27, SD = 1.46) as more threatening than butterfly pictures (M = 1.08, SD = 1.31),
t(33) = 9.80, p < .001, d = 2.30.
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Behavioral Recognition and Approach Task (RaBAT)
We applied a RaBAT version that was already used by
Genschow et al. (2013, Study 2). Participants were in-
structed to put, but not to press, one of their index fingers
onto the space bar of the computer keyboard. After a fixa-
tion cross on the white screen was presented for a randomly
selected time (500–2,000 ms), a picture on the screen ap-
peared. Participants were told that as soon as they recognize
the picture as either a butterfly or a spider, they have to
press their finger onto the space bar and then to press the
Z key on the Swiss keyboard (Y key on English language
keyboards) as fast as possible. After pressing the Z key,
the picture was zoomed in for 1,000 ms until it was 25%
larger to illustrate the approach character of the movement
(cf. Seibt et al., 2008; van Dantzig et al., 2008). After the
zooming, participants were told to put their finger again
on the space bar. Then, the next trial began. Similar to a
go/no-go task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), we randomly in-
cluded trials with distractor pictures to which participants
were not allowed to react to ensure that participants only
reacted when they really recognized a picture as a butterfly
or as a spider.
The RaBAT contained a practice (15 trials) and a main
phase (20 trials). In the practice phase, participants had to
respond toward rectangles and triangles, but were not
allowed to respond toward circles. In the main phase, par-
ticipants responded toward butterflies and spiders, but were
not allowed to respond toward stars. To prepare the data for
the analysis, we discarded all latencies below 200 ms
(0.75%) and above 2,000 ms (0.55%) and then log-trans-
formed all latencies. Afterwards, we computed mean recog-
nition times (time between the appearance of a stimulus on
the screen and the pressing of the space bar) and mean
approach movement times (time between pressing the
space bar and pressing the Z key) for butterflies as well
as spiders. Although we used log-transformed latencies in
our analyses, we report the untransformed latencies to ease
the interpretation.2
Results
To test our hypotheses, we computed an ANOVA with two
repeated measurement factors (response: recognition vs.
approach movement; stimulus category: butterfly vs. spi-
der) on the response times. As expected, the analysis
yielded a significant interaction between response and stim-
ulus category, F(1, 55) = 6.88, p = .01, gp
2 = .11 (see
Figure 1 for means). Contrast analyses indicate that partic-
ipants recognized spider pictures faster than butterfly pic-
tures, F(1, 55) = 4.73, p = .03, gp
2 = .08. Conversely,
participants approached butterfly pictures faster than spider
pictures, F(1, 55) = 4.00, p = .05, gp
2 = .07.3 In addition to
the significant interaction effect, but less relevant for the
hypotheses, the analysis revealed a nonsignificant main ef-
fect for stimulus category, F(1, 55) = 1.53, p = .22, and a
significant main effect for response, F(1, 55) = 285.90,
p < .001, gp
2 = .83.
We also computed mean recognition and approach
response times for each spider and butterfly, and then tested
the predicted effects on the level of stimuli with a mixed
ANOVA with response as within and stimulus category
as between factor. Congruent to the participant-based anal-
ysis, the stimulus-based analysis yielded a significant
interaction between response and stimulus category,
F(1, 18) = 5.34, p = .03, gp
2 = .22, indicating that spiders
(M = 566 ms, SD = 25) are recognized faster than butter-
flies (M = 590 ms, SD = 21), and butterflies (M = 332 ms,
SD = 12) are approached faster than spiders (M = 340 ms,
SD = 17). Planned contrast analyses confirm this interpre-
tation for recognition responses, t(18) = 2.24, p = .04,
d = .84, but not for approach movements, t(18) = 0.90,
p = .38. In addition to the significant interaction and similar
to the participant-based analysis, the main effect of
response was significant, F(1, 18) = 2,450.37, p < .001,
gp
2 = .99, indicating faster approach responses
(M = 336 ms, SD = 15) than recognition responses
(M = 578 ms, SD = 26). The main effect of the stimulus
category was not significant, F(1, 18) = 1.39, p = .25.
Discussion
Previous research has shown that positive stimuli are
often recognized (Bargh et al., 1992; Unkelbach et al.,
2008, 2010; see also Balota, 1994) and approached (Brendl
et al., 2005; Chen & Bargh, 1999; De Houwer et al., 2001;
Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; van Dantzig et al., 2008)
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Figure 1. Mean recognition times and mean approach
movement times (in ms) toward spider and butterfly
pictures (error bars indicate standard errors).
2 Independent of whether we analyze the data with the log-transformed latencies or with the latencies in ms, we find the same results.
3 After participants had completed the RaBAT, we also assessed their fear of spiders by using the German version of the SAS and FSQ.
However, we found neither an influence of the SAS nor of the FSQ score on the RaBAT scores, which may be due to the fact that
participants in our sample had relatively low levels of fear of spiders.
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faster than negative stimuli. The present study, however,
shows that individuals recognize negative stimuli faster
than positive stimuli when the negative stimuli were related
to threat, but that individuals approach threatening stimuli
not faster than positive stimuli.
The results illustrate an adaptive interplay between
approach movements and recognition times and the impor-
tance of disentangling these two responses from each other.
The described pattern was found for an analysis on the basis
of the participants as well as on the basis of the stimuli. In
the participant-based analysis, recognition times were faster
for threatening than for positive stimuli, and approach times
were even slower for the threatening than for the positive
stimuli. The stimuli-based analysis revealed the same
effects, although it did not detect an effect on the approach
movements. As the stimuli set was limited to 10 pictures for
each category, one may speculate whether an increase in
the number of tested pictures would have revealed a similar
effect as on the participants-based analysis. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that both analyses clearly show the
speed advantage of threatening stimuli in the recognition
task, and they also show that recognition and approach
times are not affected in the same direction by the stimulus
category.
These findings are in line with a motivational
account underlying approach-avoidance predispositions
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010), proposing that the evalua-
tion of objects triggers functional responses to change the
distance between the self and that object in order to fulfill
fundamental needs of survival and nurturance. Freezing and
a quick avoidance movement may be the most natural re-
sponses to threatening stimuli (e.g., Rinck, Kwakkenbos,
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Becker, 2010). However, in situa-
tions where approach is necessary a cautious and slow exe-
cution of the movement is also functional. For example, in
case you identify a bird spider in your vacation rental a
careful and consciously controlled approach movement
might be the most functional behavior to catch the spider.
The mechanism that underlies such an effect can be at least
twofold. First, it might be that a slowed down approach
movement is a prepared natural response to threatening
stimuli. Alternatively, it may be that the approaching of
threatening stimuli is slowed down because the fast ap-
proach movement of threatening stimuli, which was actu-
ally required from the participants by our instruction,
does not feel right. That is the recognition of threat may
have activated the probably more natural behavioral reper-
toire of avoiding the stimulus and thus may have inhibited
the approach movement. Future research may explore
whether one or even both of these explanations account
for the effect.
A third alternative explanation for the slower
approach movements toward threatening stimuli might
be due to a previous freezing reaction. However, this
explanation seems to be less likely in view of the gen-
eral findings in the literature (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch,
2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007). These findings clearly dem-
onstrate that avoidance movements to spiders compared to
butterflies are sped up. If indeed a freezing reaction
has slowed down the approach movements in our present
study, one would expect that every movement that may
follow should slow down as well. Since past research
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007)
has not found support for this assumption, we regard it as
rather unlikely that freezing reactions in response to threat-
ening stimuli have slowed down the approach movements
in our present study.
An interesting question is whether the observed effects
on the recognition times are driven by feelings of threat,
feelings of disgust, or both. Past research has shown that
beside feelings of threat, spiders, and snakes often elicit dis-
gust also and that disgust contributes to a fast recognition of
these targets similarly as threat does (Wiens et al., 2008).
Our data does not allow for testing whether perceived dis-
gust, threat, or both contribute to our findings. However,
disgust and threat can be regarded as general warning feel-
ings (e.g., Woody & Teachman, 2000). We suppose that, on
a higher level such warning feelings lead by default to func-
tional responses such as a fast recognition (e.g., Lipp &
Waters, 2007; Tipples et al., 2002) and a fast avoidance
movement (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Rinck &
Becker, 2007).
A further finding of the present research was that partic-
ipants took longer to recognize than to approach the pre-
sented pictures. We are careful to interpret this result as
meaningful. We rather suggest that this pattern is merely
dependent on the distance between the keys. With a larger
keyboard (or another key closer to the screen) the differ-
ence would increase, with a smaller keyboard (or a key clo-
ser to the spacebar) it would decrease.
As far as we know, the RaBAT is the first task that used
pictures, instead of words, to test differences in recognition
of positive compared to negative (Genschow et al., 2013)
and of positive compared to threatening stimuli (present
study). Although Genschow et al. (2013) found faster rec-
ognition times of positive than of negative stimuli and we
found faster recognition times of threatening than of posi-
tive stimuli in the present study, the interpretation of the
findings is still limited. As pictures, but not words, were
used, it may be that not the perceived valence or threat of
the stimuli, but specific features of the pictures account
for the found effects.
In sum, the present findings illustrate the usefulness and
versatility of the RaBAT. While previous research has
mainly focused on approach-avoidance and recognition
responses toward threatening stimuli by measuring these
components separately, we were interested in the interplay
between approach movements and recognition times.
Whereas previous research with the RaBAT showed paral-
lel effects of valence on recognition and approach move-
ment times (Genschow et al., 2013), the present findings
of theoretically predicted opposite effects on the two mea-
sures clearly attest to the validity of the RaBAT and high-
light the usefulness of separately measuring recognition and
approach. Disentangling these components reduces noise
and improves the validity of the assessment.
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